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CONTRACTS-EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS-A Bank's
Liability for Ordinary Negligence: Lynch v. Santa Fe
National Bank

INTRODUCTION
In Lynch v. Santa Fe NationalBank,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals
held that a bank acting as an escrow agent may excuse itself from its
own ordinary negligence by means of an exculpatory clause contained in
a standard-form escrow agreement. The negligence of the bank in Lynch
was uncontested, and the court's decision rested solely on the issue of
whether the exculpatory clause should be enforced under the circumstances of the case.' The New Mexico court applied parts of a six-point
test borrowed from the California case of Tunkl v. Regents of the University
of California,3 and upheld the bank's freedom to contract away liability
for its own negligence. This Note will explore the desirability of that
holding in light of the position which a bank occupies in the community
and in light of the reasonable expections of a bank's customers.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The bank's negligence in Lynch arose from the release of documents
held by the bank under an escrow agreement with Lynch and Lucero,
parties to a real estate sale.' Lynch entered into a real estate contract with
Lucero to purchase property located in San Miguel County, New Mexico.
The contract was placed in escrow with the Santa Fe National Bank in
February 1976. 5 The escrow agreement, which was a standard printed
form provided by the bank, contained the following exculpatory clause:
As a controlling part of the consideration for the acceptance of this
escrow, it is agreed that the Bank shall not be liable for any of its
acts or omissions done in good faith, nor shall it be liable for any
claims, demands, losses or damages made, claimed or suffered by
through or be
any party to this escrow, excepting such as may arise
6
caused by the Bank's wilful or gross negligence.
, 627 P.2d 1247 (Ct. App. 1981).
N.M. __
, 627 P.2d at 1248-49.
Id. at
60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
, 627 P.2d at 1248.
N.M. at __
__
Transcript of Record [hereinafter cited as Record] at 38-39, Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank,
, 627 P.2d 1247 (Ct. App. 1981). The Record is presently on file at the
N.M.
__
University of New Mexico Law Library, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
627 P.2d at 1249.
-,
N.M. at
6. __
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

__
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This clause appeared on the back of the bank's standard form, in small
print.
One month after the first escrow was set up, Lynch entered into a
second real estate contract to sell the property purchased from Lucero to
a third party, Buckley.7 The second contract, which was also placed in
escrow with Santa Fe National Bank, .was a wraparound agreement by
which Buckley assumed the annual payments due Lucero. 8 When Buckley
failed to make the annual payment due in March of 1977, Lucero gave
him written notice of default. Buckley promised that payment would be
made by May 1.9 The annual payment was still outstanding in May, and
Lucero asked the bank to release both sets of escrowed documents, declaring that Buckley had defaulted on his contract.' 0 The bank complied
with Lucero's request, even though the terms of the escrow agreement
between Lucero and Lynch provided that default would occur thirty days
after the bank received a copy of written notice of non-payment directed
to Lynch." The bank knew that it was Buckley, and not Lynch, who had
received written notice from Lucero.' 2 In fact, the bank had specifically
advised Lynch, who had become aware of the situation, that he should
not make the overdue payment himself, but should wait and see if Buckley
responded to Lucero's notice.' 3
As a result of the bank's release of the documents to Lucero, Lynch
expended more than $20,000 in attorney's fees to recover the documents
and reinstate the escrow."' He then sued Santa Fe National Bank for
negligence in releasing the documents, seeking damages in the amount
of his attorney's fees. ' The bank raised the exculpatory clause in its
7. Record at 39.
8. Id. A wraparound agreement is a form of secondary financing by which a buyer assumes the
seller's existing obligation on the property and also agrees to make additional payments to the seller.
In the Lynch-Buckley contract the Buckleys agreed to assume the balance on the Lucero contract
and to pay the Lynches for their equity over a 17-year period. Id.
9. Id. at39-40.
10. Id. at 40.
11.Id.at8,40.
12. Id. at40.
unaware that the escrow with Santa Fe National Bank had been
13. Id. In July 1977, still
terminated, Buckley sold the property to Weldon Carmichael, who immediately tendered payment
of the amounts in default to the bank. Id. His payment was refused, and he was notified that the
contracts concerning the property had been returned to Lucero. Id.
14. Id. Litigation began in San Miguel County between Carmichael, as plaintiff, and Lynch and
Lucero as defendants, with Lynch entering a counterclaim against Lucero for specific performance
of the terminated contracts. Carmichael v. Lynch, No. 12,123 (N.M. Sup. Ct., decided May 24,
1979 in an unreported opinion). The trial court held that the escrow at Santa Fe National Bank had
been improperly terminated and ordered that all documents be returned to the bank for specific
performance of the terms of the contracts. The supreme court affirmed. ---. __N.M. at __
627 P.2d at1248.
15. Record at 40. Another issue raised at trial was whether attorney's fees are a recoverable item
of damages in a subsequent suit against the party who created the necessity for incurring those fees.
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escrow agreement as a defense. The sole issue at trial, as stipulated by6
the parties, was whether the exculpatory provision should be enforced.'
The trial court upheld the provision and granted the bank's motion to
dismiss. 7 Lynch appealed.
ANALYSIS

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The court of appeals'
decision turned on its adoption and interpretation of a six-point formula
set out in a California case, Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California. ,8This formula was developed by the California courts to determine
at what point an exculpatory clause so transgresses public interests that
it should be held unenforceable.' 9 The test, as accepted by the New
Mexico court, provides that an exculpatory clause will not be given effect
where:
[11 [The transaction] concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation.
[2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service
The bank argued the general proposition that, absent statutory authority, attorney's fees are not
properly recoverable damages. Transcript of Proceedings [hereinafter cited as Proceedings] at 18- , 627 P.2d 1247 (Ct. App. 1981). While
N.M.
19, Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, -.acknowledging that the present case was unlike prior New Mexico cases, in that Lynch was seeking
to recover attorney's fees in an action subsequent to the original litigation in which the fees were
incurred, the bank directed the court's attention to the case of Insurance Shares Corp. of Delaware
v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 42 F.Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1941), which involved a similar situation.
Proceedings at 20. In that case, a suit was brought subsequent to a tort action in order to recover
attorney's fees from someone who was not a party to the original suit. The federal court held that
"a Plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees incurred in connection with the suit to recover damages
for a tort. Nor can he avoid the effect of this rule by bringing a separate and subsequent action to
recover them." 42 F.Supp. at 129.
The trial court granted Santa Fe National Bank's motion to dismiss on the ground that the
exculpatory clause should be upheld, and this was the issue addressed on appeal. The Transcript of
Proceedings, however, indicates that the conclusions of the trial court were based as much on the
issue of attorney's fees as on that of the exculpatory clause. In its decision from the bench, the trial
court made the following remarks:
['lihe evidence in this case further indicates and the law of New Mexico
persuades the Court, that even if there were found to have been an exception to
the general rule relating to exculpatory clauses of this nature, that, generally
attorney's fees are not awarded unless there is a statute which permits the recovery
of that or where there is the existence of a contract right, such as in the customary
provision in a promissory note. I believe the third exception is in cases in equity
such as injunctions, dissolutions of marriages and so on.
Proceedings at 42.
16. Record at 31. The parties stipulated at the opening of the trial that "[tlhe issue between the
parties is whether or not the exculpatory provision in the escrow agreement is to be enforced in this
case." Id. They then proceeded to argue a second issue on the recoverability of attorney's fees. See
note 15, supra. This second issue was never discussed on appeal.
17. Record at 44.
18. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
, 383 P.2d at 444-45, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
19. 60 Cal. 2d at __
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of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical
necessity for some members of the public.
[3] The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service
for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member
coming within certain established standards.
[4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic
setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses
a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of
the public who seeks his services.
[5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the
public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and
makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence.
[6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of
the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller [of the service],
subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.2"

It was not made clear in Tunkl how many of these elements must be
present before an exculpatory clause contravenes the public interest. The
California Supreme Court merely stated that "[t]o meet that test, the
agreement need only fulfill some of the characteristics above outlined.
•2 Of the six points in the Tunkl test, the New Mexico Court of
interest,
Appeals addressed itself to Points 1 and 2, dealing with public
22
advantage.
bargaining
with
dealing
5,
and
4
Points
and to
BargainingAdvantage:
The Tunki formula considers two aspects of bargaining advantage. The
first, as expressed in Point 4, is the superior bargaining position occupied
by a party offering an essential service to members of the general public.
The second, as expressed in Point 5, is the use of this superior bargaining
position to impose an exculpatory provision, in the form of a standardized
adhesion contract, on those members of the public who seek that party's
services.
627 P.2d at 1251-1252.
-,
20. ___ N.M. at
, 383 P.2d at 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
21. 60 Cal. 2d at
, 627 P.2d at 1250, 1252, 1253. The six points of the TunkI formula
N.M. at
22.
are set out in full in the second section of the Lynch opinion, dealing with public interest. TunkI,
however, is also cited in the first section on bargaining advantage, as is Akin v. Business Title Corp.,
264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968), a case with a fact pattern similar to that in Lynch.
The California court in Akin applied Points 4 and 5 from Tunkl in reaching a decision on the bargaining
position of the parties involved. The issues raised in Points 3 and 6 are not specifically discussed
in Lynch, but the facts set out in the opinion itself and in the record on appeal confirm that they
were met in this case: Santa Fe National Bank did hold itself out as willing to perform escrow
services, Proceedings at 13-14; and it was the bank's control over the documents held in escrow
which made the negligent release of the documents to Lucero possible. -.... _..N.M. at
627 P.2d at 1249.
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At trial, Lynch laid the foundation for establishing that the escrow
agreement was a contract of adhesion.23 Generally, a contract of adhesion
is one drawn up by the party in the stronger bargaining position and
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the second party, who is forced
by economic or business circumstances to accept the terms of the contract. 24 Lynch's position, at trial and on appeal, was that the escrow
agreement used by Santa Fe National Bank was of this type,25 citing Akin
v. Business Title Corp.26
Akin was a California case which applied the Tunkl formula to determine
that an exculpatory clause in an escrow agreement should not be given
effect. In that case, as in Lynch, the plaintiff was presented with a standard,
printed form escrow agreement drafted entirely by the escrow agent; there
was no opportunity for bargaining between the parties before the agreement was signed; and the customer was not given the opportunity of
paying an additional fee to have the exculpatory language removed from
the agreement. 27 The Akin court held that the escrow agent did possess
superior bargaining strength in relation to its customers and that its standard-form contract did qualify as a contract of adhesion under the Tunkl
formula.28 In reaching its holdings, the court implied a lack of choice by
the weaker party on the basis of his weakness alone. 29 It distinguished
23. Proceedings at 32.
24. Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition and Its Application to Banking, 11 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 297, 301-302 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sybert, Adhesion Theory in
California]. Several judicial and scholarly definitions of contracts of adhesion are collected in Sybert's
article. Edwin Patterson, in his article, The Interpretationand Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum.
L. Rev. 833,856 (1964), suggested that the term "contract of adhesion" had its origin in R. Saleilles,
De La Declaration De Volunte § 89, at 229-30 (1901):
There are pretended contracts that have only the name, the juridical construction
of which remains yet to be made. For these, in any event, the rules of individual
interpretation should undergo important modifications, if only that one might call
them, for lack of a better term contracts of adhesion, those in which a single will
is exclusively predominant, acting as a unilateral will which dictates its law, no
longer to an individual, but to an indeterminate collectivity, and which in advance
undertakes unilaterally, subject to the adhesion of those who would wish to accept
the law [loi of the contract and to take advantage of the engagements imposed
on themselves.
Concern over the use of adhesive contracts is of long duration. As early as 1917 with Nathan Isaacs'
article, The Standardizingof Contracts, 27 Yale L.J. 34 (1917), America's legal commentators have
struggled with the best way to deal with these "pretended contracts." New Mexico does not appear
to have recognized the concept of adhesive contracts. The only references to the term in Lynch are
found in material quoted from the California decisions in Tunkl and Akin. By means of a footnote,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals referred the reader to Akin for an explanation of "contracts of
- , 627 P.2d at 1252, n. 1.
N.M. at
adhesion." __
- , 627 P.2d at 1250.
N.M. at
25. __
26. 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 287 (1968).
, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 287 (1968).
27. Id. at 28. Id.
29. Id. The court stated that "superior bargaining power need not have its source in monopoly,
but that it may simply be the result of a 'monopoly' in judgment, brains and foresight as where one
party prepares the contract from which the other signs without considering the possible consequences." Id.
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an earlier holding in Delta Airline, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,3 in
which an adhesion contract was found not to exist, on the ground that
Delta possessed economic strength and resources equal to that of the other
contracting party. 3 The Akin court emphasized the difference in bargain-

ing position between individual people and huge corporations: "[Tihe
individual seller of property

. . .

in dealing with the escrow company, is

not comparable to Delta Air Lines dealing with Douglas. The individual
seller of property does not have the economic power or legal and executive
assistance that Delta had .... "I'

In contrast, the New Mexico court in Lynch set a much more rigorous
standard for establishing a party's absence of choice. It refused to accept
Lynch's contention that the bank had taken advantage of its position as
the more powerful bargainer to include within the contract a clause relieving itself of the consequences of its own negligence. 33 The New
Mexico court held that Lynch could not claim to have been required to
deal with Santa Fe National Bank unless he could establish an absence
of alternatives. 34 This could be accomplished only by showing that he
had actively sought, and had been unable to find, an escrow agent willing
to offer its services without the protection of an exculpatory clause.35 The
court's position was based on its interpretation of the phrase "required
to deal" used in Tyler v. Dowell, Inc.,36 a case from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: Exculpatory clauses "will not be
enforced if the promisee enjoys a bargaining power superior to the promisor, as where the promisor is required to deal with the promisee on his
own terms." 3 7

With its decision in Lynch, the New Mexico court did not rule out the
possibility that, under certain circumstances, an inequality of bargaining
positions might make a contract suspect. Instead, it put the burden on
the party seeking the court's protection to prove that he did, in reality,
have no choice but to enter into that contract. This is a heavier burden
than that imposed by the California courts, which require only that no
practicalchoice exist in dealing with a particular party. It is left to future
cases to determine whether a consumer must exhaust every possible source
of the goods or services he seeks before entering into a restrictive contract
in order to obtain relief from the terms of that contract in New Mexico's
courts.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
264 Cal. App. 2d at
- , 70 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
Id.
__
N.M. at
-,
627 P.2d at 1250.
Id.
Id.
274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960).
Id.at 895.
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The holding in Lynch is entirely consistent with New Mexico's traditional position upholding freedom of contract.3" The court of appeals
acknowledged that the issue of whether an exculpatory clause should be
enforced is a matter of policy.39 The California court in Tunkl saw this
policy in terms of shifting the risk of negligence from the consumer to
the business entity with which he deals.' In contrast, the New Mexico
court in Lynch saw the policy as one involving freedom of contract and
the conditions under which that freedom should be restricted.4 1
Public Interest:
The second aspect of the exculpatory clause discussed by the court of
appeals in Lynch concerned the effect of its enforcement on public interest.
Lynch argued that because of the nature of a bank's relationship with its
customers, the escrow services offered by Santa Fe National Bank affected
public interest.42 The court rejected this argument, holding that the public
service nature of the escrow agreement must be determined "without
regard to the fact that defendant is a bank.""
In reaching its decision, the court used Points 1 and 2 of the Tunkl
formula,' as well as examples from New Mexico cases which have found
specific contracts to violate public policy.45 Looking first to New Mexico
law, the court concluded that the exculpatory clause in Lynch did not
contravene any of the previously established standards of statutory law,
public duty imposed by statute, or public policy as defined by the state
or one of its municipalities. 46
The court then turned to the concept of public interest outlined in Tunkl.
The New Mexico application of the criteria set out in Tunkl was extremely
narrow. The Tunkl court held that public interest is affected if the trans38. Cf., In re Carson's Will, 87 N.M. 43, 529 P.2d 269 (1974) (upholding a contingency fee
contract between attorney and client); In re Tocci, 45 N.M. 133, 112 P.2d 515 (1941) (denying
motion to set aside settlement agreement between wife of deceased worker and employer for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act); Ravany v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United
States, 26 N.M. 514, 194 P. 873 (1921) (upholding annuity contract where the trial court found the
consideration offered by the insurance company to be grossly inadequate in relation to the purchase
price of the policy).
, 627 P.2d at 1253.
39.
N.M. at _
40. This was the interpretation of TunkI made by the New Mexico Court of Appeals. Id.
41. Id. As stated by the court:
The cases cited herein, which discuss whether an exculpatory clause should be
enforced, recognize that such a decision is one of policy. Thus, Tunkl v. Regents
of University of California, supra, discusses the policy of shifting the risk of
negligence. The basic issue, however, involved the policy of freedom of contract
and is concerned with when that freedom is to be restricted.
, 627 P.2d at 1252.
42. Id. at __
43. Id.
-,
627 P.2d at 1252-1253; See supra text accompanying note 19.
44. __
N.M. at
, 627 P.2d at 1251.
45. __
N.M. at _
46. Id.
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action "concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation." 47 In Lynch, the New Mexico court refined this holding to
require that the particular activity in which the regulated business is
engaged be specifically subject to regulation.4" Distinguishing the California cases of Tunkl and Akin, the court noted that neither party had
pointed out any regulation of escrow services in New Mexico,49 and stated
that: "[a]lthough defendant is a bank, that fact alone does not make
defendant's escrow service either a banking function or a public service. '"50 The only concession the court made to Lynch's position, and
that only "for the purposes of this appeal," was that the second point of
the Tunkl test, requiring the service to be one of great importance to the
public, had been met.5
With its requirement that the activity be specifically regulated to be a
"public interest" activity, the Lynch court overlooked the nature of the
relationship between a bank and its customers. This relationship exists
regardless of the particular service involved, The American banking industry is a highly regulated business. While privately owned, all banks
must be incorporated under the requirements of either state or federal law
and are further subject to government supervision and control in virtually
every phase of their organization and operation. 2 This network of state
and federal regulation developed during the 1930's when public confidence in the country's banks was almost non-existent. Following the stock
market crash of 1929, thousands of banks closed their doors and billions
of dollars in individual deposits were lost.53 In an effort to restore public
confidence in the banking system, the federal government passed several
emergency measures, including the reorganization of the Federal Reserve
System and the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in
1933. 54
Since the 1930's, banks have carefully nurtured the aura of stability
and security created by state and federal regulation. One measure of their
success can be seen in the express sanctions given to the use of banks
by trustees and fiduciaries, traditionally held to the highest standards of
care in the preservation and management of capital.55 Because of the
historical development of the banking industry, and the fact that so many
aspects of banking are regulated, the average bank customer normally
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

,383 P.2d at 445, 32 Cal Rptr. at 37.
60 Cal. 2d at
- , 627 P.2d at 1253.
N.M. at
Id.
- ,627 P.2d at 1252.
Id. at
Id.
R. Rodgers, Banking 180 (1965).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146-47.
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§45-5-424C(6) and 45-7-401D(6) (1978).
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assumes that whatever business he transacts with a properly chartered
banks falls within some area of regulated activity. To allow a banking
institution to take advantage of public confidence when offering services
which, in fact, provide its customers with no protection from the bank's
substantial financial loss for
ordinary negligence, and which can result in
6
the customer, contravenes public interest.1
An Alternative to the Court's Decision in Lynch:
A parallel can be drawn between the circumstances in Lynch and the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in New Mexico. 7
The UCC applies only to the sale of goods. It does not apply directly to
other consumer transactions, such as the sale of services or the rental of
property. Some of the warranty concepts contained in the UCC, however,
have been extended to analogous sales situations. Courts have frequently
made this extension in the area of rental agreements. 8 In Lemle v. Breeden,59 one of the first cases to apply warranty concepts to a lease agreement, the court used the following reasoning to affirm the recovery of
damages by a lessee: "a lease is, in essence, a sale as well as a transfer
of an estate in land and is, more importantly, a contractual relationship.
From that contractual relationship an implied warranty of habitability and
fitness for the purposes intended is a just and necessary implication." 6
By analogy, a bank's services correspond to the goods dealt with in
the UCC, and the bank is a merchant with respect to such services. The
UCC states that "[ulnless excluded or modified . . . a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." 6 A similar
warranty should arise under a contract for the sale of escrow services by
56. In a few jurisdictions the everyday bank-customer relationship has been elevated to a fiduciary
level, usually based on the reasonable expectations of the customer and on his reliance on the bank's
advice and expertise. See Hagedom, The Impact of Fiduciary Principles on the Bank-Customer
Relationship in Washington, 16 Willamette L. Rev. 803 (1980).
Two early California cases also present examples of a bank's obligation to explain the terms of
agreements entered into with its customers. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Bank, 180 Cal.
601, 182 P. 293 (1919) and Frankini v. Bank of America, 31 Cal. App. 2d 666. 88 P.2d 790 (1939).
Both cases involved exculpatory provisions in account agreements which absolved the bank from
liability to the customer for cashing forged checks from funds in the customer's account. At the time
these cases were decided, liability was based on common law tradition rather than on a statutory
duty or regulation, but the California court held the exculpatory provisions in both cases invalid,
characterizing them as a trap for the unwary which the bank was under a duty to disclose to its
customers before enforcement of the provisions would be permitted.
57. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§55-1-101 to 55-9-507 (1978).
58. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971) for a survey of jurisdictions which have accepted the
application of an implied warranty of habitability to rental agreements.
59. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
60. Id. at 462 P.2d at 474.
61. N.M. Stat Ann. §55-2-314(l) (1978).
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a "merchant" bank. Such a warranty would require that the services be
designed to accomplish the purpose set out in the bank's contract with
its customers, and that the manner of the execution of the services pass
without objection within the banking and financial community.6 2 The use
of an exculpatory clause would be permissible, but only if it conformed
to the requirements of the UCC for the exclusion or modification of
warranties.63
A similar analogy to the UCC was made by the Kansas Supreme Court
in Belger CartageService, Inc. v. Holland Construction Co.' The court
in Belger held that it would be against public policy to enforce an exculpatory clause releasing the lessor of a crane from liability for the
negligence of its employees.6 5 The decision was based, in part, on an
application of the requirement in Section 2-316(2) of the UCC that any
exclusion or modification of implied warranties be in writing and be
"conspicuous. "' The exculpatory clause in Belger was in small print on
the reverse side of the lessor's work order form, and no attempt was made
to draw the lessee's attention to the clause. 67 The Kansas Supreme Court
held that in determining the enforceability of the exculpatory clause, the
trial court was entitled to consider the totality of the transaction, including
out
whether the lessee had knowledge of the clause by having it pointed
68
to him, or by the clause itself being conspicuous in the contract.
In Lynch, the exculpatory clause in Santa Fe National Bank's escrow
agreement was also in small print on the reverse side of its standard
form. 69 No attempt was made to draw Lynch's attention to the clause
relieving the bank from liability for negligence in the performance of its
duties as an escrow agent. 70 Had Santa Fe National Bank been a merchant
of goods rather than a provider of services, the escrow agreement between
the bank and Lynch would not have withstood the scrutiny of the courts.
Hedged as the banking industry is with the sanctity of government support
and regulation, it would be reasonable for the courts to hold that it is in
the public interest for customers of a bank to enjoy at least the same
protection as customers of a local department store.
In rejecting Lynch's arguments on the public interest issue, the court
of appeals again chose to favor a policy of encouraging freedom of
62. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-314(2) (1978).
63. See N.M. Stat. Ann § 55-2-316 (1978), which sets out the methods by which warranties may
be excluded or modified.
64. 224 Kan. 320, 582 P.2d 1111 (1978).
, 582 P.2d at 1120.
65. Id. at
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Proceedings at 12.
70. Id. at 12-13.
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contract rather than one protecting the consumer.7' In dealing with this
issue, the court missed an opportunity to reach a workable compromise
between these competing philosophies. By requiring banks to give the
same type of notice of a disclaimer of liability that is presently required
for the exclusion or modification of warranties under the UCC, the court
could have given some protection to the consumer of banking services
without any damage to the banking industry. Under a notice requirement,
similar to that required of other merchants, banks would retain the option
of limiting the extent of their liability through the use of exculpatory
provisions. Their only additional burden would be to insure that such
provisions are sufficiently conspicuous to alert the consumer to the terms
of the contract into which he is entering.
CONCLUSION
Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank is a reaffirmation of New Mexico's
traditional approach to contract law. It is a decision based on policy and,
as such, is a warning to New Mexico practitioners. Other jurisdictions,
most notably California, have chosen to extend protection to the individual
consumer through a more liberal interpretation of contracts entered into
with such businesses as hospitals, 72 escrow companies,

73

and insurance

74

companies. New Mexico has chosen to treat all contracting parties
equally and to enforce contract terms strictly. As a result, citing precedent
from other jurisdictions, even precedent directly on point, is likely to be
ineffective in overcoming the traditional attitude of New Mexico courts
toward freedom of contract. Changes in this attitude will come only when
the courts are willing to accept the proposition that protection extended
to the consumer will not necessarily jeopardize the effective use of contracts by the business community.
MARGARET B. ALCOCK
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